

Blacklists as an Instrument of the Famine-Genocide of 1932–1933 in Ukraine

Repressions targeting classes, estates, social groups, nations, and nationalities, as well as individuals were a substantial element and daily routine in the sociopolitical life of the “Land of Soviets” from the very beginning of the Bolshevik dictatorship. In Jörg Baberowski’s apt observation, for the new rulers of one-sixth of the world “economic crisis, dissatisfaction, and criticism were proof not of the shortcomings of their political strategy but of the work of class enemies. Thus the task of the revolution lay in exposing and eliminating them from the world for all time.”¹ Repression was presented as an indispensable condition of the development of Soviet society. The point of departure here was Stalin’s theoretical “discovery” concerning the further evolution and intensification of the class struggle in the USSR “in the conditions of building a socialist society.” As Vladimir Shlapentokh aptly noted, “Stalin saw in each citizen a potential enemy and spy. Every soldier and officer was a potential deserter or traitor. He presumed that the average Soviet individual—if not a political enemy—was or could be a thief, a bandit, or a loafer.”² This meant that it was necessary to repress practically everyone. The first to be targeted by repression was the peasantry, the most powerful and principal class and national enemy of the Communist Party. (As early as 1925, Stalin had declared that “in essence, the national question is a peasant question.”³ Therefore, in “resolving” the peasant question, he was also seeking to resolve the nationality question.)

Essentially, starting in the second half of the 1920s, the ruling circles in the USSR revived the atmosphere of civil war. On the ideological level, this was established through the escalation of the class struggle, confrontations among various population groups, and the need to use punitive means to liquidate “kulaks” (meaning well-to-do farmers who ran commercial farms, able farmers, hardworking peasants, as well as all former opponents of the Soviet regime), who were regarded as the last exploitative class in Soviet society. In order to split the countryside into poor peasants, peasants of average means, and “kulaks,” the Bolsheviks introduced the mechanism of mandatory deliveries of agricultural produce to the state, the most substantial portion of which was supposed to be carried out by the latter category. The isolated upper stratum of the countryside was subject to physical and economic destruction, expulsion, and deportation. The Bolsheviks thus sought to intimidate other peasants and make them more compliant, attempting to neutralize even the potential for mass resistance. Moreover, the “kulaks” were declared political outlaws: they were stripped of the right to vote and forced to pay huge contributions for the right to run their own homesteads (a single agricultural tax, a fixed levy, etc.). Nonfulfillment automatically entailed criminal liability.⁴

Starting in 1926, the GPU (Soviet political police) became involved in efforts to resolve questions pertaining to grain procurements. At the preliminary stage, their task was quite limited: “uncovering the reasons delaying the delivery of grain to market by its holders,” price fluctuations, as well as uncovering criminal actions, such as waste, theft, fraud, and spoilage of grain. But the involvement of the political police in the implementation of the state grain-procurement plans, along with that of ordinary administrative organs, clearly indicated that the grain campaign was taking on the character of a political struggle whose results depended directly on the activities of the organs of

¹ I. Baberovski [Jörg Baberowski], *Chervonyi teror: Istoriia stalinizmu* (Kyiv, 2007), 30.

² V. Shlapentokh, *A Normal Totalitarian Society: How the Soviet Union Functioned and How It Collapsed* (Armonk, N.Y., 2001), 34.

³ I. Stalin, *Marksizm i natsional'no-kolonial'nyi vopros: Sbornik izbrannykh statei i rechei* (Moscow, 1935), 153.

⁴ See, e.g., the resolution of the VUTsVK and the CPC of the UkrSSR dated 4 April 1933 “On Changes in the Legislation of the Ukrainian SSR in Connection with the Establishment of Obligatory Delivery to the State of Grain, Potatoes, and Sunflower Seeds by Collective Farms and Independent Farmers,” which introduced into the Criminal Code a term of not less than five years as punishment of “kulak elements” for nonfulfillment. See *Zibrannia zakoniv ta rozporiadzhen' robitnycho-selians'koho uriadu USRR*, no. 18 (1933): 2–3 (art. 216).

repression and punishment. In addition, measures were adopted to ensure the “unity of the system of accusation” (that is, by the militia, investigative bodies, and prosecutors’ offices). The status of prosecutors was elevated by the subordination to them of the whole investigative apparatus, turning the prosecutor’s office into a “checkpoint of central rule” in the localities. In this way, all institutions directly involved in sociopolitical experiments in the countryside were placed under its control.⁵

The arsenal of repressive and punitive measures developed and tested in the course of the anti-peasant struggle was variegated. It included measures intended to punish not just individuals but entire groups, enterprises, population centers, and even administrative units, which was reflected in the creation of a system of collective liability through the introduction of so-called blacklists. The essence of this concept of repression devised by the Soviet authorities lay in a primitive dichotomy of Bolshevik perception whereby the world was divided into “our people” (“Reds”) and enemies or those who abetted them (“Whites,” “Blacks”). Conversely, the finest individuals, collectives, enterprises, and institutions were singled out and entered on honorary redlists, which could take the form of honors lists complete with portraits or lists of pacesetters published in the press. Those so honored received commensurate moral or material rewards. Those who “worked badly,” that is, violated Soviet barracks-style discipline, failed to carry out the plans issued from above, or “abetted the class enemy” in some other way, were placed on a blacklist of infamy and shame. They were also subjected to various moral, administrative, and material sanctions.

To this day, there is no consensus on the specific date and circumstances of the official introduction of the blacklist system. Existing information indicates, however, that blacklists, as a type of repression targeting the peasantry, were already beginning to be applied actively in early 1932 or even in 1931. A consolidated register of population centers and collective farms in Ukraine that were placed on blacklists was compiled in 2008 by the Ukrainian Institute of National Remembrance on the basis of data from various regions. This document ascertained the following chronology and geography of the introduction of the blacklist system.

On 15 January 1932, the Frunze collective farm of the Dmytrivka village soviet, Znamianka county (raion), Odesa province (oblast), was placed on the blacklist.⁶

Information on the blacklisting of eight cooperative associations (*artili*) and county organizations in Bilovodsk county, Donetsk province, is dated 1 March, April, June, and September 1932.⁷

By early June, the blacklist system had been applied to the Lushnyky, Pyrohivka, and Tymonivka village soviets of Shostka county, Chernihiv province.⁸

In August, repressive measures were instituted against the Oleksandriia village soviet of the Bila Tserkva city soviet, Kyiv province; the Dolynivka, Zhyvanivka, Kozyrivka, Komyshuvatka, Lozuvatka, Nazariivka, Fedorivka, and Cherniakhivka village councils in Odesa province; the collective farms in the village of Popova Sloboda (the Molotov, Shevchenko, Petrovsky, and Stalin cooperatives as well as the “Ukrainets,” “Dniprova khvyliia,” “Pershe travnia,” and “Chervonyi Donbas” cooperatives) in Chernihiv province.⁹

⁵ I. Subochev, “Diial'nist' orhaniv iustytisii Ukraïny v umovakh zdiisnennia polityky kolektyvizatsii na seli (1928–1933)” (Abstract of Candidate of Historical Sciences dissertation, Dnipropetrovsk National University, 2006), 13–14.

⁶ Derzhavnyi arkhiv Kirovohrads'koï oblasti (hereafter DAKO), f. P-68, op. 1, spr. 5, ark. 5.

⁷ Reported in *Chervonyi kolhospyk* (Voroshylivhrad), 1 March, 14 May, 29 June, and 30 September 1932.

⁸ Reported in *Zoria* (Shostka), 9 June 1932.

⁹ Reported in *Kolektyvist Buryshchyny*, 8 August 1932.

In September, the Hannivka and Hermanivka village soviets in the same province were blacklisted,¹⁰ as were the Zarichia and Rotok village soviets of the Bila Tserkva city council.¹¹

However, most of the decisions passed on this question by the authorities on the county and province levels were adopted in October 1932: on 16 October the villages of Babyne, Velykyi Bolhrad, Petrivka, and Smidovychi, Odesa province, were blacklisted.¹²

That same month in Chernihiv province, the town of Buryn and suburban collective farms, the Holovyne, Kupets, Mykolaivka, and Mykhailivka village soviets,¹³ and independent farmers residing in twelve villages in Chernihiv county were blacklisted.¹⁴

According to a decision of the local authorities in Dnipropetrovsk province, the Bilenke, Kupriianivka, Malokaterynivka, Marivka, Matviivka, Novokaterynivka, Rozumivka, Smolianka, and Stepne village councils were listed for repression.¹⁵

This type of repression, whose use was recorded in early 1932, was used to a limited degree until the summer. By the advent of summer it became more widespread, and from October onward it was applied ubiquitously. It would appear that, of all the administrative units in the Ukrainian SSR, this process bypassed Vinnytsia and Kharkiv provinces, which attests to the decentralized nature of its application.

Examples of several local party organizations reveal the concrete circumstances surrounding the use of this repressive measure even before the adoption of an all-republican resolution. On 15 November 1932, the office of the Seredyna-Buda county committee of the Communist Party (Bolshevik) of Ukraine (CP[B]U) in Chernihiv province adopted a top-secret resolution on the blacklisting of the village of Chernatske in connection with the “disgraceful state of fulfillment of grain procurement (as of 15 November, 56.6 percent has been completed).” The repressions entailed the following measures: the removal of all goods from the village and their delivery to the pacesetter village of Pyharivka; the popularization of the resolution on repressions through the county press; and the organization, in the village of Chernatske, of a guest editorial board of the CP(B)U’s county mouthpiece *Konopliar Seredyno-Budshchyny* in order to provide coverage of questions concerning grain procurement. The county leadership fell victim to repressions “for its opportunistic attitude to grain procurement, for not informing every deliverer about the plan in a timely manner, which disrupted the grain-procurement plan for the village of Chernatske; [hence it was decided to] expel the head of the village soviet, Comrade Okopsky, from the plenum of the RPC [county party committee], issue a severe reprimand with a warning, dismiss him from work in the village of Chernatske, transferring him to low-level rural work; Comrade Sydorenko, secretary of the party center, is to be issued a severe reprimand with a warning, cautioning him that in the event that there is no definite improvement of grain procurement in the next ten days, the question of his continued membership in party ranks would be raised.”¹⁶ The next day a similar question was considered by the office of the Konotop county party committee in the same province. This decision was marked by a distinctive feature: the blacklisting of several villages at once (Bochechky, Kozatske, Malyi Sambir, Khyzhky); the cautioning of a group of “candidates” by setting a trial deadline of 1 December for blacklisting (the villages of Velykyi Sambir, Sosnivka, Semianivka, Yurivka, and Shevchenkove); and the absence of a list of repressive measures concerning the

¹⁰ Reported in *Sotsialistychnyi nastup* (Zinovievsk), 17 August, 2 October 1932.

¹¹ Reported in *Radians'ka nyva* (Bila Tserkva), 27 and 31 August; 8, 10, and 22 September 1932.

¹² Reported in *Komuna stepu*, 16 October 1932.

¹³ Reported in *Kolektyvist Burynshchyny*, 22 October 1932; *Zoria* (Shostka), 28 October 1932.

¹⁴ Reported in *Chervonyi stiah* (Chernihiv), 13, 20, 23, and 25 October 1932.

¹⁵ Reported in *Chervone Zaporizhia*, 23, 27, and 29 October 1932.

¹⁶ Derzhavnyi arkhiv Sums'koï oblasti (hereafter DASO), f. P-33, op. 1, spr. 211, ark. 106–7.

aforementioned villages. It was merely noted that “all measures applicable to blacklisted villages” would befall them. This could mean only one thing: that such a list of mandatory repressive measures already existed and had been circulated widely enough not to require specification. The heads of the county division of the GPU, the prosecutor, and the judge were released from their duties as the county’s plenipotentiary officials in particular villages in order to concentrate on the prompt examination of “grain-procurement” cases under their jurisdiction.¹⁷

The first official document enacted on the all-Ukrainian level in which the term “blacklists” was used and its tragic content revealed was a resolution issued by the republican Communist Party headquarters on 18 November 1932. It included the following list of repressive measures: the complete suspension of all trade (on the state, cooperative, and collective-farm levels); the suspension of the delivery of goods; the removal of all goods available in stores (eventually, this measure came to be known as “goods repressions”); a ban on credits of any kind and the preterm repayment of loans and other financial obligations issued earlier (“financial repressions”); and a thoroughgoing purge of “counterrevolutionary elements” among the members of collective farms and local executive bodies.¹⁸ The official state document that introduced this system was the resolution of the Council of People’s Commissars (CPC) of the Ukrainian SSR “On the Struggle against Kulak Influence on Collective Farms,” dated 20 November 1932, together with an appended instruction. The latter document ordered that, “in order to overcome kulak resistance to state grain procurement, collective farms that are maliciously sabotaging the delivery (sale) of grain according to the state plan are to be ‘blacklisted.’” This was followed by a verbatim recapitulation of the contents of the resolution of the Central Committee (CC) of the CP(B)U, the only difference being that the republic-level resolution was written in Russian, while the CPC resolution was issued in both Russian and Ukrainian. The right to blacklist collective farms was granted to provincial executive committees.¹⁹

A campaign was immediately launched to inform local organs about the above-mentioned party and Soviet resolutions and to stimulate the creation of appropriate lists in local areas. In particular, the office of the Kharkiv provincial committee of the CP(B)U, in its resolution “On the Progress of Grain Procurement,” dated 20 November 1932, ordered the mobilization of all party organizations in the province and all Soviet and collective-farm activists for the fulfillment of the CC CP(B)U resolution of 18 November 1932. It also ordered the communist fraction of the provincial executive committee to draft measures concerning the application of fines in kind, the blacklisting of collective farms, and the purging of rural party centers, including the deportation of purged individuals from the province as politically harmful and dangerous elements.²⁰ On 21 November, the Chernihiv provincial committee of the CP(B)U circulated the following directive to county party committees: immediately to provide lists of homesteads that were “sabotaging grain procurement” for blacklisting.²¹

Within days of the official announcement, these repressions were instituted everywhere. As early as 26 November 1932 Oleksandr Serbychenko, deputy head of the CPC of the Ukrainian SSR, issued a summary memorandum on this question to the republican party headquarters. He directed the attention of the CC CP(B)U to local “excesses,” including the following: the exceedingly broad use of blacklists (eight counties in Vinnytsia province), the use of repressive measures not only against collective farms but also villages and village councils (Autonomous Moldavian Soviet Socialist Republic [AMSSR], Donetsk province), excessively high fines (up to 1,000 rubles on

¹⁷ DASO, f. P-42, op. 1, spr. 168, ark. 83–84.

¹⁸ *Holodomor 1932–1933 rokiv v Ukraïni: Dokumenty i materialy*, comp. R. Pyrih (Kyiv, 2007), 392–93.

¹⁹ See the uncertified collotype copy of the resolution in Tsentral’nyi derzhavnyi arkhiv vyshchykh orhaniv vlady i upravlinnia Ukraïny (hereafter TsDAVO Ukraïny), f. 806, op. 1, spr. 22, ark. 532.

²⁰ Derzhavnyi arkhiv Kharkivs’koï oblasti (hereafter DAKhO), f. P-2, op.1, spr.11, ark. 51–56.

²¹ Derzhavnyi arkhiv Chernihivs’koï oblasti (hereafter DACHO), f. P-470, op. 1, spr. 15, ark. 17–18, 20–21.

average per homestead in Dnipropetrovsk province, and 382 rubles on average per homestead in Chernihiv province).²²

This summary memo recorded the following information as of 26 November:

Vinnitsia province: a single resolution passed by the provincial executive committee served to blacklist 8 counties (all villages and collective farms in Bratslav, Lypovets, Liubar, Nemyriv, Stanislavchyk, Chudniv, Khmilnyk, and Tulchyn counties), 39 villages, and 33 collective farms in other counties;

Dnipropetrovsk province: 85 collective farms;

Donetsk province: 4 villages and 4 village soviets;

Chernihiv province: 13 collective farms; 38 villages; 1,646 independent farmers;

Kharkiv province: as of 23 November, no village or collective farm had as of yet been blacklisted;

AMSSR: 2 collective farms and 1 village.

Kyiv and Odesa provinces did not send in their data on time, so they do not figure in this document, although, as we have seen, blacklists had already been instituted there in the summer. Moreover, the summary document mentions the proposals of two provincial executive committees to place on the all-Ukrainian blacklist the village of Horiachivka (Kryzhopil county); the municipality of Liubar (Liubar county); the village of Karpivtsi (Chudniv county); the village of Mazurivka (Khmilnyk county); the village of Turbiv (Lypovets county) in Vinnitsia province; the village of Astakhove (Rovenets county); the village of Hurzuf (Mariupil county); and the Vladyka collective farm (Staromykolsk county) in Donetsk province.²³

Two weeks later, the People's Commissariat of Agriculture of the Ukrainian SSR disseminated new official information on the geography and number of blacklisted entities as of 2 December 1932:

Vinnitsia province: the same 8 counties; 44 collective farms in other counties; independent farmers in 42 villages;

Dnipropetrovsk province: 228 collective farms in 44 counties;

Donetsk province: 12 collective farms, 6 villages, 2 village soviets, independent farmers in 25 villages;

Kyiv province: 51 collective farms in 48 villages located in 19 counties;

Odesa province: 12 collective farms located in 9 counties;

Kharkiv province: 23 collective farms in 16 villages located in 9 counties;

Chernihiv province: 13 collective farms, 38 villages, 1,646 independent farmers.

The number of repressed collective farms and administrative units remained unchanged only in the AMSSR.²⁴

The information disseminated by the People's Commissariat of Agriculture noted the same shortcomings regarding the use of blacklists as mentioned in Serbychenko's letter. But the sad irony was that these very "shortcomings" soon became everyday practice, inasmuch as they fell within the framework of the party's general policies. The logic of the Bolshevik struggle against the peasantry led to the mass implementation of collective repressions that targeted administrative and economic units, institutions, enterprises, and even individuals. They were actively used by the central and provincial party and Soviet organs, although questions were often decided on the county level as well. In addition, provincial executive committees raised the question of establishing an all-Ukrainian blacklist

²² *Holodomor 1932–1933 rokiv*, 414.

²³ Tsentral'nyi derzhavnyi arkhiv hromads'kykh ob'iednan' Ukraïny (hereafter TsDAHO Ukraïny), f. 1, op. 20, spr. 5394, ark. 8–10.

²⁴ *Holodomor 1932–1933 rokiv*, 435–36, 439.

and even nominated several candidates for it: five villages in Vinnytsia province, twelve in Kyiv province, and four in Odesa province.

The central Ukrainian authorities eagerly supported local initiatives intended to ratchet up the momentum of collective repression. On 6 December 1932, after Lazar Kaganovich had instituted blacklisting in the Kuban region, the CC CP(B)U and the CPC of the Ukrainian SSR issued a joint resolution “On the Blacklisting of Villages Maliciously Sabotaging Grain Procurements.” As a result, six population centers in Dnipropetrovsk, Odesa, and Kharkiv provinces were punished “for obvious disruption of the grain-procurement plan and malicious sabotage”: they were completely deprived of deliveries of goods, forbidden to engage in commerce, and denied credits, while state and cooperative activists as well as all members of collective farms located in those villages subject to purges.

It is worthwhile to examine the specifics of how this resolution was made public. All existing archaeological publications, including the most complete collection to date, *Holodomor 1932–1933 rokiv v Ukraïni: dokumenty i materialy* (The Holodomor of 1932–1933 in Ukraine: Documents and Materials), compiled by Ruslan Pyrih, are based on the text published on 8 December 1932 in the newspaper *Visti VUTsVK* (News of the All-Ukrainian Central Executive Committee). The original text of this resolution, including the signatures of Stanislav Kosior and Vlas Chubar, found in the TSDAHO,²⁵ has never been published. It is therefore worth noting the list of villages included in the all-Ukrainian blacklist. According to the text published in the aforementioned newspaper, these were Verbka in Pavlohrad and Havrylivka in Mezhovala counties, respectively, Dnipropetrovsk province; Liutenky and Kamiani Potoky in Hadiach and Kremenchuk counties, respectively, Kharkiv province; and Sviatotoitske and Pisky in Troitske and Bashtanka counties, respectively, Odesa province.²⁶

Documents held in regional state archives augment this list with the villages of Motnyky, Hadiach county, Kharkiv province; Sverdlivka, Pavlohrad county, Dnipropetrovsk province;²⁷ and Onufriika (the “Nove zhyttia” collective farm) of the Kashpero-Mykolaivska village council, Bashtanka county, Odesa province. This picture has yet to be analyzed thoroughly, but it is already clear that the all-Ukrainian blacklist was open-ended, meaning that new targets could always be added.

It is an interesting fact that this resolution contradicted the earlier one of 18 November, since it was not a collective farm as a unit of the “socialist” economy nor even a village soviet as an administrative economic unit that was targeted for blacklisting but a village, that is, a certain locale with all its inhabitants, including members of collective farms, independent farmers, artisans, workers, employees of educational, cultural, and health-care institutions, and so on. Once again, this underscores the fact that the goal of Bolshevik policy was not so much the formal implementation of the grain-procurement plan (this was merely a pretext) as the destruction of the peasantry and all who lived in the countryside. Consequently, the republic’s communist party headquarters was not troubled by the glaring contradictions in its own resolutions. It may be assumed that the next “local initiative” regarding the application of the blacklist system to any target whatever, not just collective farms, was approved in this manner. It should be mentioned here that subsequently entire party and Komsomol centers, the personnel of Machine-Tractor Stations (MTSs), timber industry enterprises, employees of county institutions (even legal advice offices that bore no relation to agriculture), and individual members of collective farms were blacklisted merely for not showing up to work and other reasons. The blacklist became a universal weapon aimed at all rural residents.

²⁵ “Pro zanesennia na ‘chornu doshku’ sil, iaki zlisno sabotuiut’ khlibozahotivli,” TsDAHO Ukraïny, f. 1, op. 6, spr. 238, ark. 53–54.

²⁶ *Visti VUTsVK*, 8 December 1932, published in *Holodomor 1932–1933 rokiv*, 449.

²⁷ Derzhavnyi arkhiv Luhans’koï oblasti (hereafter DALO), f. P-28, op. 1, spr. 454, ark. 245; Derzhavnyi arkhiv Odes’koï oblasti (hereafter DAOO), f. P-11, op. 1, spr. 141, ark. 45.

The propagandistic goal of the resolution on the blacklists was obvious: to intimidate and ensure the submissiveness of the peasants, and to spur the local organs into actively undertaking work to carry out the party directives. This is corroborated by an analysis of the contents of a telegram sent by the CC and the CPC to the leaders of the three above-mentioned provinces, which contained instructions on how to apply the resolution. Kosior and Chubar insisted on the “decisive and thorough” implementation of repressive measures, the use of all forms of political work, and the like. The following is noteworthy: “In villages that have fallen under kulak influence and have been blacklisted by resolution of the CC and the CPC it is essential, by the appropriate arrangement of organizational and political work, to wrest the better collective farm members and independent farmers from kulak influence and, with their active participation, not only to make short shrift of the kulaks and their accomplices but also to liquidate their influence on collective farms and among independent farmers and to achieve the fulfillment of the grain-procurement plan.”²⁸ Clearly, the phrase “make short shrift of the kulaks” was a straightforward directive meaning, if not their physical liquidation, then at least the use of a number of other types of repression, including confiscation of property, deportation, and court proceedings. It was also a veiled incitement to apply lynch law against them, inasmuch as the Communist Party leadership sought to prove that the very existence of the kulaks was the main reason for the creation of such inhumane living conditions in villages subjected to repression.

Documents held at the DAKhO offer concrete examples of repressive measures instituted against those who were considered kulaks and subkulaks [kulak allies] or those who had fallen under “kulak influence.” On 30 November 1932, the bureau of the Bohodukhiv county committee of the CP(B)U in Kharkiv province passed a resolution “On Further Repressive Measures against Villages and Collective Farms Blacklisted for Malicious Nonfulfillment of Grain-Procurement Plans.” This document ordered the heads of party centers and communist fractions of county executive committees and MTSs to make a thorough review of the composition not only of the leading bodies but also of rank-and-file collective farm members “with the goal of expelling the entire hostile kulak element.” Such lists were to be sent to the investigative organs “in order [for the kulaks] to be brought to account.”²⁹

News of these reprisals appeared in a newspaper item describing the state of affairs in the village of Pisky (A. Marti collective farm), Bashtanka county, Odesa province, which had been placed on the all-Ukrainian blacklist. In the month following the announcement of repressions, the stockman (*komirnyk*) at the collective farm was sentenced to ten years in prison, and the residents of thirty homesteads were deported from Ukraine. The rural correspondent also mentioned the surnames of seven other kulaks who had actively sabotaged grain procurements. Emphasizing that they were not the only ones, he urged people “not to fuss with them” but “to struggle in order to wash away the black stain” by shipping tons of grain out of the village.³⁰

Being placed on the republican blacklist meant that, besides all the above-mentioned repressive measures, central and local government bodies would take additional significant actions. Otherwise it would be difficult to explain why, three days after two villages in Kharkiv province were placed on the all-Ukrainian blacklist, the secretariat of the provincial committee of the CP(B)U approved a special decision “On the Blacklisting of the Villages of Liutenky in Hadiach County and Kamiani Potoky in Kremenchuk County as Villages That Are Maliciously Sabotaging Grain Procurements,” which was adopted following a poll of the secretariat’s members.³¹

²⁸ Telehrama RNK USRR i TsK KP(b)U ta do kerivnykiv Dnipropetrovs’koi, Odes’koi ta Kharkivskoi oblastei u zv’iazku z postanovoiu pro zanesennia sil na “chornu doshku,” 06.12.1932, in *Holodomor 1932–1933 rokiv*, 450–51.

²⁹ This document is held at DAKhO, f. P-80, op.1, spr.43, ark. 306–306^v.

³⁰ Reported in *Pid praporom Lenina* (Bashtanka), 19 January 1933.

³¹ DAKhO, f. P-2, op. 1, spr. 22, ark. 77.

Such a view is warranted if one reckons with the final point of the resolution handed down by the CC CP(B)U and the CPC of the Ukrainian SSR on 17 October 1933 concerning the removal of the village of Kamiani Potoky from the blacklist. This part of the document discusses the rescindment of “all resolutions and orders of people’s commissariats of the Kharkiv provincial executive committee and other central, provincial, and county organs concerning the use of any repressions or restrictions against the village of Kamiani Potoky in connection with its blacklisting.”³² Clearly, every organ, depending on its jurisdiction and level, made its own contribution to rendering living conditions in this village intolerable.

The peak of blacklisting pressure on the countryside occurred in late November and December 1932. In this period, more than 80 percent of all the population centers, collective farms, village soviets, and counties in the Ukrainian SSR where such repressions are known to have been implemented were blacklisted. A letter sent by the CC CP(B)U to the CC of the All-Union Communist Party (Bolshevik) on 8 December named 400 collective farms that had been repressed through blacklisting. It is obvious, however, that this is not the final figure, given that, as of early December 1932, Dnipropetrovsk province alone accounted for more than half (225) the total. An exact tally cannot be established owing to the lack of essential data on all provinces of the Ukrainian SSR.

To all intents and purposes, the question of who had the authority to compile a roster of blacklists was not on the agenda. For the most part, the promulgated order was maintained: such a roster was to be compiled at the provincial level. An example of such activity is the resolution adopted by the Donetsk provincial executive committee on 5 December 1932, which blacklisted the “Nove zhyttia,” “Voroshilov,” “Chervonyi partyzan,” “Peremoha,” “Povna Derevnia,” and “9-oho sichnia” collective farms, located in various counties; the collective farm in the village of Zvirivka in Hryshyne county; the village of Nova Derevnia in Stara Karan county; the collective farm members and independent farmers of the Dubrovka village council in Chystiakove county, etc. It is known that, as in Chernihiv province, the provincial committee of the CP(B)U and the provincial organizational bureau also issued decisions in this connection.³³ In Kharkiv province, the procedure for blacklisting collective farms was the subject of a special decision handed down by the secretariat of the Kharkiv provincial party committee, which was adopted by means of a poll that emphasized the need to abide by the established order of issuing such a decision by means of a resolution of the provincial executive committee.³⁴ A classic example of the procedure for adopting a resolution on blacklisting comes from Vinnytsia province, where on 19 November the provincial executive committee ratified a resolution “On the Progress of Grain Procurements in the Counties of the Province,” the true meaning of which was revealed in the very first point: “The following counties, villages, collective farms, and independent homesteads in villages that, under the influence of profiteering and grasping elements, set out to sabotage grain procurements, that is, the nonfulfillment of their duty to the proletarian state, are to be blacklisted” [This is followed by a lengthy list of 6 counties, 40 village councils, and 31 collective farms].³⁵ A resolution passed by the bureau of the Vinnytsia provincial committee of the CP(B)U, with practically the same title, was issued earlier, on 17 November. Among other things, it noted: “Within a twenty-four-hour period, the [communist] fraction of the OEC [provincial executive committee] is to hand down a resolution on the blacklisting of those counties, villages, and collective farms that are maliciously sabotaging grain procurements. The draft of the resolution is to be ratified (appended).”³⁶ The provincial executive committee meekly duplicated the draft prepared by the provincial party headquarters but failed to do so by the designated deadline.

³² Postanova TsK KP(b)U ta RNK USRR pro zniattia z “chornoï doshky” s. Kam’iani Potoky Kremenchuts’koho raionu Kharkivs’koï oblasti, 17.10.1933, in *Holodomor 1932–1933 rokiv*, 960–61.

³³ Postanova Chernihivs’koho oblorhbiuro KP(b)U vid 09.12.1932 pro zanesennia na “chornu doshku” kolhospiv, iaki zlisno ne vykonuiut’ planu khlibozahotivel’, held at DACHO, f. P-450, op. 1, spr. 9, ark. 100.

³⁴ Protokol zasidannia Kharkivs’koho oblpartbiuro no. 9 vid 17.12.1932, held at DAKhO, f. P-2, op.1, spr. 22, ark. 82–83.

³⁵ Postanova Vinnyts’koho oblvykonkomu “Pro perebih khlibozahotivel’ po raionakh oblasti,” 19.11.1932, held at Derzhavnyi arkhiv Vinnyts’koï oblasti (hereafter DAVO), f. R-2700, op. 1, spr. 1, ark. 175–76.

³⁶ Postanova biuro Vinnyts’koho obkomu KP(b)U “Pro perebih khlibozahotivel’ v oblasti,” 17.11.1932, held at DAVO, f. P-136, op. 1, spr. 17, ark. 20–23.

County bodies (both party and Soviet organs) often engaged in intense activity. These included corresponding bureaus of county party committees and presidiums of county executive committees, that is, a smaller number of personnel attached to those local organs (up to ten people, as a rule). Thus, in Buryn county, Sumy province, such a resolution was passed on 29 October 1932 by the county executive committee; on 15 November by the office of the Seredyna-Buda county party committee; and on 16 November by the bureau of the Konotop and Shostka county committees of the CP(B)U.³⁷ On 5 February 1933, the presidium of the Bilovodske village council of Romen county, Chernihiv province, handed down a decision on the use of repressions against the “Vilnyi shliakh” collective farm for disrupting grain procurements.³⁸ In Dolyna county, Dnipropetrovsk province, a mixed system of designating candidates for death by starvation was introduced. Thus, on 3 December 1932 the village of Ivanivka was blacklisted by decision of the county committee of the CP(B)U, while the villages of Hurivka and Oleksandrivka were placed on the list by resolution of the presidium of the county executive committee on 12 November; later, on 21 November, this decision was upheld by the county party committee.³⁹

In Kharkiv province, contrary to the above-mentioned special method of blacklisting solely by resolution of a provincial executive committee, as early as 14 January 1933 the same type of decision, targeting the hamlets of Shmorivky, Temnivky, and Shubina, was passed by a “joint expanded meeting of the presidium of the Lyzohub village soviet and the administrations of collective farms in the Kharkiv suburban zone.”⁴⁰ On 16 February 1933, by decision of the bureau of the Zolochiv county committee of the CP(B)U, the village of Velyka Rohozianka was blacklisted for “disrupting the deadline established by the provincial committee of the CP(B)U for creating a seed fund in the county,” and subjected to all the repressions specified in the resolution of the CC CP(B)U dated 18 November 1932.⁴¹

Usually, such decisions were given broad coverage in the party and Soviet press. Even the “Top Secret” stamp, which figured on all party and Soviet decisions, was no impediment. The party headquarters would pass a special resolution concerning the publication of certain points of its resolution in the public press, inasmuch as the example of population centers that had been blacklisted was supposed to strike terror in others. Moreover, the party and Soviet leadership demanded the “support of the whole population” for its measures. This meant drumming up approval for these repressive actions on the part of the very population that was being deprived of the means for survival. Thus, a general meeting of women was held on 25 December 1932 in the Chernatske village soviet, which had been blacklisted on 15 November. Under the watchful eye of the Communist Party, the participants unanimously approved a resolution supporting the use of repressive measures against those who were “sabotaging” grain procurements.⁴²

An object selected for inclusion on the blacklist was supposed to be important and known within a given region. During his trip through Odesa province in December 1932, Kaganovich recorded the following entry about Domanivka county in his journal: “Small collective farms of between 18 and 26 homesteads have been chosen to be blacklisted, without impact.” Such a comment indirectly corroborates

³⁷ See DASO, f. P-2303, op. 1, spr. 23, ark. 5; f. P-33, op. 1, spr. 211, ark. 106; f. P-42, op. 1, spr. 168, ark. 83; f. P-25, op. 1, spr. 24, ark. 162–64.

³⁸ Postanova prezydii Romens'koho raivykonkomu vid 05.02.1933, DASO, f. R-4549, op. 1, spr. 345, ark. 19.

³⁹ Derzhavnyi arkhiv Dnipropetrovs'koï oblasti (hereafter DADO), f. R-19, op. 1, spr. 169, ark. 118, 134–35, 181–82; spr. 122, ark. 134–35; *Na sotsialistychnykh lanakh*, 13 December 1932.

⁴⁰ Protokol no. 1 vid 04.01.1933 spil'noho zasidannia prezydii Lyzohubivs'koï sil's'koï rady ta pravlin' kolhospiv Kharkivs'koï prymis'koï smuhy, held at DAKho, f. R-408, op.8, spr. 943, ark. 6–7.

⁴¹ Protokol no. 52 vid 16.02.1933 zasidannia biuro Zolochivs'koho raipartkomu KP(b)U, held at DAKho, f. P-96, op. 1, spr. 34, ark. 20–21.

⁴² Protokol zahal'nykh zboriv zhynok kolhospu “Chervonyi Zhovten” Chernats'koï sil'rady Seredyno-Buds'koho raionu, 25.12.1932, held at DASO, f. P-33, op. 1, spr. 227, ark. 15–16.

the observation that nonfulfillment of grain-procurement plans was simply a pretext for instituting repressions.⁴³

In very short order, the party and state organs acknowledged the “insignificant effect” of the adopted measures. Putting a complete halt to commerce turned out to be impossible. According to an information item drafted by the republican People’s Commissariat of Agriculture on 2 December 1932, “the residents of such counties and villages have not been deprived of the possibility to purchase goods in neighboring villages or counties.” Moreover, according to the CC CP(B)U, “the countryside [was] already quite saturated with goods,” and those needed on a daily basis could still be purchased at higher prices. Greater effectiveness was attributed to fines, above all, fines in kind, as well as to the preterm collection of payments in kind, cash debts, and credits. On the local level, repressive measures took on even more brutal forms: a struggle against the relatives of peasants who worked in the industrial and transport sectors; the reduction of collective-farm acreage; the dispatching of so-called auxiliary teams and “authorized individuals”; the confiscation of domestic animals, and so on. Thus blacklisted locales found themselves outlawed and consequently subjected to additional measures not covered by normative acts. By a decision of the Berdiansk county executive committee dated 28 December 1932, the following measures, in addition to a ban on commerce, were instituted against the blacklisted “Shevchenko” and “Chervonyi stiah” collective farms of the Novooleksiivka and Nohai village councils, respectively: the immediate (by 28 December) payment of all debts, the imposition of fines in kind (meat) to be delivered by 5 January 1933, a ban on milling of any kind, and the dispatching of brigades to ensure that all this was carried out.⁴⁴ On 21 January 1933 the (female) secretary of the Melitopil county (Dnipropetrovsk province) party committee and head of the county executive committee sent a secret directive to the Soviet and party centers of the Kostiantynivka village council concerning the blacklisted “Radianskyi step” collective farm, demanding the total confiscation of all grain issued earlier to the collective-farm members; the complete payment of debts within 48 hours, followed by the imposition of a meat tax and fine in kind against debts; the confiscation from every collective-farm member of livestock, domestic fowl, and other valuable property; and the restitution by the collective-farm members of 200 tons of grain (allegedly pilfered and concealed). All these measures were to be carried out by 24 January; otherwise, legal repressions would be applied. In addition, all advances in kind were to be returned by 25 January. For failure to comply, Communist Party and Komsomol members were threatened with expulsion from their respective organizations, and collective-farm members with expulsion from collective farms.⁴⁵ In order to exert influence on the peasants of Sumy province through their worker relatives, party centers located in factories based in Shostka were ordered “to conduct work among workers who have a connection with agriculture, compelling them to carry out the task of grain collection at once, applying to individual malicious non-deliverers such measures as dismissal from work and expulsion from trade unions.”⁴⁶ As early as 18 November 1932, a special resolution adopted by the bureau of the Kharkiv provincial committee titled “On Repressions” ordered the confiscation of private plots from “malicious non-deliverers of grain,” in addition to the levying of fines in kind.⁴⁷

⁴³ For Kaganovich’s diary of his trip to Ukraine on 20–29 December 1932, see *Komandyry velykoho holodu: poïzdky V. Molotova i L. Kahanovycha v Ukraïnu ta na Pivnichnyi Kavkaz, 1932–1933 rr.*, ed. Valerii Vasyl’iev and Iurii Shapoval (Kyiv, 2001), 327.

⁴⁴ See “Vytiah z protokolu Berdians’koho raivykonkomu pro represyvni zakhody do kolhospiv, zanesenykh na ‘chornu doshku,’” 28.12.1932, in *Holodomor 1932–1933 rokiv*, 527.

⁴⁵ Dyrektyva Melitopol’s’koho raikomu KP(b)U Kostiantynivs’komu mizhkolhosnomu osередku KP(b)U, sil’radi ta upovnovazhenomu RPK po kolhospakh Kostiantynivs’koï sil’rady vid 21.01.1933, held at Derzhavnyi arkhiv Zaporiz’koï oblasti (hereafter DAZO), f. P-233, op. 3, spr. 2, ark. 16.

⁴⁶ Postanova biuro Shostkyns’koho raikomu KP(b)U vid 16.11.1932 pro pokarannia partiinykh ta radians’kykh pratsivnykiv raionu, sil Ivot, Chuikivka, Shatryshche, Prokopivka, Kaliivka, Obrazhiivka, zanesenykh na “chornu doshku” za nezadovil’nyi stan khlibozahotivli, held at DASO, f. P-25, op. 1, spr. 24, ark. 162–64.

⁴⁷ Protokol no. 13 vid 22.12.1932 zasidannia biuro Kharkivs’koho obkomu KP(b)U, held at DAKhO, f. P-2, op. 1, spr. 11, ark. 97–98.

The well-publicized list of repressive measures applicable to blacklisted entities was constantly expanded. “Financial repressions” were an important component of this list. The order issued by the head of the Trostianets county branch of the Ministry of Finance of the Ukrainian SSR required, in addition to the early repayment of all types of loans, the closing of all accounts of corresponding collective farms. In order to implement these penalties levied against repressed collective farms subject in the village of Boromlia, the head of the bank branch traveled there in person.⁴⁸ We have comparable data on Bohodukhiv county, Kharkiv province. Following the blacklisting of the villages of Polkova Mykytivka, Sinne, and Oleksandrivka (the Shevchenko, Stalin, “Pravda,” and “Nova hromada” cooperative associations (*artilei*) as well as the independent farming sector in these villages), one of the points of a special resolution passed on 30 November 1932 by the county committee of the CP(B)U in connection with the “malicious nonfulfillment of grain-procurement plans” ordered the heads of local banking institutions to call in “all short-term and long-term loans from these collective farms” within three days and, further, to suspend all crediting and even ordinary cash payments. The county finance department was to secure the collection of all state payments levied on collective farms and independent farmers.⁴⁹ There were even cases of blacklisting for the “disruption of the mobilization of financial resources,” which referred to the refusal of peasants to subscribe to the “state loan” that had been foisted upon them.⁵⁰

The example of the village of Horodyshche, Voroshilov county, Donetsk province, which was blacklisted in November 1932, reveals that the local authorities, intimidated by directives from above, tried to save their own skins and hold on to their positions by creating inhumane conditions for the inhabitants of “blacklisted” villages. The above-mentioned village was situated near the large railway station of Debaltseve, which location stimulated illegal commerce near the station. A considerable proportion of its residents worked in mines and handicraft workshops and owned fine private plots; hence the standard blacklisting measures had not produced the desired results. Then the Voroshilov city committee of the CP(B)U came up with the following: it drew up a closed distribution list excluding more than a thousand family members of collective-farm workers and independent farmers who worked in manufacturing; held back preterm credits in the amount of more than 23,500 rubles; and confiscated the seed stock of a collective farm for grain procurement. In addition, the city committee requested permission from the provincial party committee to levy a fine in kind equivalent to a fifteen-month meat quota, confiscate the finest plots of land for the coal miners’ food-product depots, and dismiss from industrial enterprises a minimum of 150 members of families living in Horodyshche that had been accused of disrupting grain procurements; if this “sabotage” were to continue, the guilty parties would be deported to the Soviet Far North.⁵¹

Repressions against local party officials and authorized functionaries who had not ensured that repressive measures were applied with the requisite brutality were an important component of the blacklist system. For example, the Kharkiv provincial committee of the CP(B)U dealt very harshly with authorized officials who had been dispatched from the provincial administration to guarantee the fulfillment of grain-procurement plans on blacklisted collective farms. For their “criminal inactivity and failure to combat kulak sabotage,” four of these officials were recalled from various counties and investigated by the party, while the work of all other officials was to be checked scrupulously by secretaries of county party committees. The provincial committee was to send “vigorous” authorized officials to replace those who had been summarily dismissed. Local leaders were ordered to take personal control and responsibility for

⁴⁸ *Holodomor 1932–1933 rokiv na Sumshchyni*, comp. L. Pokydchenko (Sumy, 2006), 220.

⁴⁹ Postanova biuro Bohodukhivs'koho raikomu KP(b)U Kharkivs'koï oblasti vid 30.11.1932 “Pro dodatkovu represii dlia sil i kolhospiv, shcho vziati na ‘chornu doshku’ za zlisne nevykonannia khlibozahotivli,” held at DAKhO, f. P-80, op.1, spr. 43, ark. 306–306^v.

⁵⁰ Four village soviets in Ovruch raion, Kyiv province. See *Shliakh kolektyvizatsii* (Ovruch), 10 August 1933.

⁵¹ Dopovidna zapyska Voroshylov'skoho mis'kkomu partii Donets'komu obkomovi KP(b)U vid 04.01.1933, in *Holodomor 1932–1933 rokiv*, 572–74.

the state of affairs on the above-mentioned collective farms.⁵² On 16 February 1933, the Zolochiv county party committee approved a decision warning local leaders and the authorized official of the county party committee that they would be prosecuted “according to the strictest measure of responsibility” if they did not rectify the grain-collection situation on those collective farms.⁵³

Repressions were also instituted against local Communist Party and Komsomol centers. On 16 November 1932, the Shostka county party committee warned the Ivot and Prokopivka party centers that the “severest measures of party influence” would be instituted against them if the resistance of “kulaks” was not broken; reprimands were issued to other leaders of party centers in blacklisted villages.⁵⁴ In February 1933, the Kharkiv provincial organs decided to blacklist the party and Komsomol organizations in Petrivka, and the Petrivka county committee of the CP(B)U was compelled to welcome this resolution.⁵⁵ Generally speaking, in accordance with the decision “On Blacklisted Collective Farms,” reached by its office, the Kharkiv provincial party committee announced the introduction of systematic *daily* checking of the implementation of measures of influence specified in the CC CP(B)U resolution of 18 November 1932 concerning such collective farms, as well as of a systematic register for keeping track of grain procurements on those farms.⁵⁶

In January 1933, when the authorities in Romen county (Chernihiv province) resolved to blacklist the village of Herasymivka “for malicious sabotage of grain procurements,” it was decided that the head of the village council and the head of the collective farm, along with his entire administration, would be “prosecuted, requesting the prosecutor’s office to institute criminal proceedings against them, with the proviso that the investigation be completed expeditiously and that the case be tried publicly, on the spot, in the village.”⁵⁷ This kind of attention on the part of the prosecutor’s office was a daily and all-encompassing phenomenon, as attested by the fact that the most complete extant list of repressed collective farms subject in Dnipropetrovsk province was discovered in the archival records of the prosecutor’s office of that province.⁵⁸

But even this broad understanding and implementation of repressive measures did not satisfy the higher party leadership. This was raised by Kosior in his speech at a meeting of the Politburo of the CC CP(B)U 20 December 1932, which was based on notes of his trip to Dnipropetrovsk province. As attested by Kaganovich’s journal, Kosior declared: “The blacklists are not driving it home. That is why there are hardly any results from them. Where commerce is banned, people are trading actively. Only 25–30 percent of the designated sum of cash fines is collected. To a great extent, the organizers of sabotage have not yet been exposed.”⁵⁹ This led the Communist Party to institute diligent control over the repressed villages. For this purpose, specially authorized officials of all levels—central, provincial, and county—were dispatched to blacklisted villages. A point was reached, for example, where on 25 December 1932 in the village of Pisky, Bashtan county, Odesa province, which had been placed on the republican blacklist, Kaganovich, the CC AUCP(B)’s plenipotentiary representative, counted up to thirty different officials in charge of grain procurement and found it necessary to record the following remark in his journal: “Today

⁵² Postanova Kharkivs’koho obkomu KP(b)U vid 14.01.1933 pro posylennia khlibozahotivel’ u zanesenykh na “chornu doshku” kolhospakh oblasti, *ibid.*, 603.

⁵³ Protokol no. 52 vid 16.02.1933 zasidannia biuro Zolochivs’koho raikomu KP(b)U, held at DAKhO, f. P-96, op.1, spr. 34, ark. 20–21.

⁵⁴ Postanova biuro Shostkyns’koho raikomu KP(b)U vid 16.11.1932, held at DASO, f. P-25, op. 1, spr. 24, ark. 162–64.

⁵⁵ Dodatok do protokolu no. 46 vid 17.02.1933 biuro Petrivs’koho raikomu KP(b)U, held at DASO, f. P-25, op. 1, spr. 24, ark. 25.

⁵⁶ Protokol no. 13 vid 22.12.1932 zasidannia biuro Kharkivs’koho obkomu KP(b)U, held at DAKhO, f. P-2, op. 1, spr. 11, ark. 97–98.

⁵⁷ Postanova Romens’koho vykonkomu vid 29.01.1933, held at DASO, f. R-4549, op. 1, spr. 345, ark. 17–17^v.

⁵⁸ DADO, f. R-1520, op. 1, spr. 9.

⁵⁹ Extract from Kaganovich’s diary of his trip to Ukraine on 20–29 December 1932, in *Komandyry velykoho holodu*, 315.

the village is getting rid of them.”⁶⁰ Checking on compliance with the generally obligatory set of punitive measures and punishments was entrusted to specially appointed plenipotentiary officials as well as representatives of party and state control agencies—the inspectorates of the CC WPI [Control Commission–Workers’ and Peasants’ Inspectorate; Ukr. KK-RSI]. For example, there are extant materials concerning the inspection of the implementation of repressive measures as required in connection with the blacklisting of population centers, which was carried out in February 1933 in the village of Brodshchyna, Kobeliaky county (Kharkiv province) by Shkarbunenko, an instructor of the Kobeliaky county CC WPI.⁶¹

In early January 1933, the Kharkiv provincial committee gave special consideration to the question of intensifying grain procurement on such collective farms. There were twenty-five of them, and only three (Zinkiv, Novoheorhiivsk, and Orzhytsia counties) were determined to have delivered 100 percent of their procurement tasks. The leaders of the Kharkiv communists therefore urged their comrades “under no circumstances to restrict themselves to half-measures in the use of repressions.”⁶²

The set of sanctions was different, relatively speaking, for county, provincial, and republican blacklists. For the most part, however, blacklisted entities were subjected to the following:

- an industrial boycott, which meant that all manufactured goods (clothing, footwear, nails, glass, ironware, inventory, etc.) were shipped out of cooperative enterprises in a village or county, new goods were not delivered, and all commerce (state, cooperative) was banned altogether;
- a financial boycott, which meant that all loans, credits, and debts had to be repaid ahead of schedule, and no new ones were issued; the unconditional sequestration of funds from a collective farm and its members for the fulfillment of financial obligations (agricultural tax, state debt, insurance), in which connection the debt of the collective farm was collected from the individual homesteads of collective-farm members; an immediate payment to cover the total subscription for loans made to the state and other “voluntary” contributions;
- additional fines, usually in the form of a meat fine in kind (the full or partial collection of the fifteen-month meat delivery obligation);
- the suspension of MTS services to a collective farm;
- the suspension of milling;
- confiscation of all existing grain to fulfill grain-procurements;
- confiscation of all grain issued to collective-farm members, with the exception of those who were fulfilling their state obligations “honestly and conscientiously,” and who also reported thieves and helped to recover stolen grain. For this purpose, such “conscientious” collective-farm members were singled out assiduously and with their help all grain was confiscated from other collective-farm members.

Cadre purges were characterized by the following measures:

- inspection and “purging” of collective farms, with the elimination of “counterrevolutionary” elements and “organizers” of disruptions of grain procurements;
- inspection and purging by the WPI organs of all types of “foreign and hostile elements” among cooperative and state personnel;
- confiscation of all certificates issued by village councils and collective farms to residents of those villages for the period in which repressions were applied;
- expulsion from the Communist Party of the secretary of a rural center of the CP(B)U, followed by his arrest and deportation to the Soviet Far North; the arrests of all “kulaks, Petliurites, pogromists, and other counterrevolutionary elements” uncovered on a collective farm (for example, in the Dmytrivka village council, Znamianka county [Odesa province],

⁶⁰ Ibid., 329.

⁶¹ DAKhO, f. R-1356, op. 1, spr. 971, ark. 48–49.

⁶² Postanova Kharkivs'koho obkomu KP(b)U vid 14.01.1933 pro posylennia khlibozahotivel' u zanesenykh na “chornu doshku” kolhospakh oblasti, in *Holodomor 1932–1933 rokiv*, 603–4.

42 people were arrested, 36 convicted, and 19 deported to the Far North, while 36 were expelled from the collective farm)⁶³;

- institution of legal proceedings against the heads and members of collective-farm administrations.

In addition, there was the ubiquitous practice of organizing special brigades (sentries) consisting of police officers, collective-farm activists, Red partisans, and other types of activists in order to regulate the movement of the residents of those villages in order to ensure the full implementation of the economic boycott measures.

One of the most appalling features associated with the introduction of blacklists was the possibility of being blacklisted twice and even three times. Available materials reveal the double blacklisting of the village of Kolodianka in Novohrad-Volynskiy county⁶⁴ and the “Petrovsky” collective farm in Vepryk, Radomyshl county, Kyiv province⁶⁵; the village of Demydove, Zhovten (formerly Petrovirivka) county, Odesa province⁶⁶; the “Dopomoha” collective farm of the Babynske village council; the eponymous village council of the Zaporizhia city council, Dnipropetrovsk province⁶⁷; and the “Avanhard” collective farm in the village of Heidelberg, Molochansk German national county, Dnipropetrovsk province.⁶⁸ The Romanivka village soviet in Dzerzhynsk county, Kyiv province, was blacklisted three times,⁶⁹ and the “Novyi shliakh” collective farm in the village of Zikrachi, Rzhyshevsk county, Kyiv province, was blacklisted four times.⁷⁰ The accusations brought against them could be different or identical. There was also a practice of nominating a collective farm or village as a “candidate for the blacklist,” which, as a rule, preceded official blacklisting. But the order in which this was done (that is, candidate to blacklisted entity) was not necessarily straightforward: sometimes the reverse occurred, from blacklisted entity to candidate.

Theoretically, the only way to be struck off the list of villages targeted for repression was to fulfill the grain-procurement plan, which was handed down from above. On 25 January 1933 two villages, Havrylivka in Dnipropetrovsk province and Liutenky in Kharkiv province—mentioned among the population centers of three provinces listed in the resolution of 6 December 1932 adopted by the CC CP(B)U and the CPC of the Ukrainian SSR—were officially removed from the blacklist in connection with “serious improvements in the fulfillment of the grain-procurement plan.”⁷¹ Not until October 1933 was the village of Kamiani Potoky (Kharkiv province) struck off the all-Ukrainian blacklist for its “achievements in the grain-procurement campaign for the current year.”⁷² However, information on the mass cancellation of repressive measures is practically nonexistent. Even the three collective farms in Kharkiv province that had fulfilled their grain-procurement obligations in January 1933 were not formally struck off the blacklist. Clearly, the authorities were in no hurry to do so, seeking to extend the regimen of inhumane conditions created in certain locales as long as possible. In contrast to the procedure of placing a target on the blacklist, the reverse operation—removal from the blacklist—was not regulated at all, nor

⁶³ See DAKO, f. P-68, op. 1, spr. 5, ark. 5; spr. 324, ark. 79, 80; op. 1a, spr. 5, ark. 5; DAOO, f. R-710, op. 1, spr. 26, ark. 19; f. P-11, op. 1, spr. 141, ark. 42–45.

⁶⁴ See *Sotsialistychnyi nastup* (Novohrad-Volynskiy), 28 November 1933; 12 December 1933.

⁶⁵ See *Borot'ba za sotsializm* (Radomyshl), 24 September 1933; 14 April 1934.

⁶⁶ DAOO, f. R-710, op. 1, spr. 26, ark. 19, 51, 90; f. P-11, op. 1, spr. 141, ark. 42–45.

⁶⁷ See *Chervone Zaporizhzhia*, 15 November 1932; 30 November 1932.

⁶⁸ *Ibid.*, 14 November 1932; DADO, f. P-19, op. 1, spr. 20, ark. 98.

⁶⁹ See *Kolektyvist Dzerzhynshchyny*, 13 November 1932; 1 December 1932; 9 February 1933; *Sotsialistychnyi nastup* (Romaniv), 5 December 1933.

⁷⁰ See *Kolektyvna nyva* (Rzhyshevsk), 4 July 1932; 26 August 1932; 9 September 1932; 21 September 1932; 16 November 1932; 21 May 1933.

⁷¹ Postanova TsK KP(b)U vid 25.01.1933 pro sela i kolhospy, zaneseni na “chornu doshku,” in *Holodomor 1932–1933 rokiv*, 620.

⁷² Postanova TsK KP(b)U ta RNK USRR vid 17.10.1933 pro zniattia z “chornoï doshky” s. Kam'iani Potoky Kremenchuts'koho raionu Kharkivs'koï oblasti, *ibid.*, 960–61.

were any provisions made for it. There is another noteworthy feature: in all the discovered information pertaining to this process, emphasis was placed on “overcoming kulak resistance,” “crushing kulak sabotage,” and the like.⁷³ This is most vividly illustrated by the following formulation of the Dnipropetrovsk provincial committee concerning the “Veselyi Kut” collective farm, which was under the jurisdiction of the Kamianka city council: “By rallying the better part of collective-farm members around the fulfillment of their very first duty before the proletarian state and the crushing of kulak sabotage, we achieved serious improvements with regard to fulfilling our grain-procurement plans.”⁷⁴

Summarizing existing information on the blacklist system during the Holodomor of 1932–33 in Ukraine leads to the following conclusions. It became a veritable weapon of genocide of the AUCP (Bolsheviks) in the Ukrainian lands. It does not suffice to treat blacklisting solely as a manifestation of “artificial isolationism.”⁷⁵ The crux of the matter was not so much the isolation of blacklisted population centers as the creation in those “reservations” of conditions of life incompatible with existence. The all-powerful leaders of the Communist Party and government ordered the removal of all manufactured goods, even ordinary consumer items; the closure of all bank accounts; the preterm collection of advances; and the levying of excessive taxes and fines on the population, on which account cattle, domestic fowl, and personal belongings were confiscated. While some individuals were subject to judicial and administrative repression, there was broad use of deportation, the forcible confiscation of private plots, and the like. In other words, a territory of affliction was created from which it was utterly impossible to escape, and all its inhabitants were, practically speaking, condemned to death by starvation. Moreover, “nonfulfillment of grain-procurement plans” or the “struggle for the harvest” were not decisive factors in designating the victims of those repressions. The key here was the size of this “reservation” and its notoriety in Ukraine.

Chronologically, the introduction of the blacklist system coincides with the beginning of the famine in 1932. Such types of repression were in force at least from the spring of 1932, becoming widespread in October–November; that is, the directives adopted by the CP(B)U on 18 November 1932 and subsequent documents merely “standardized” the existing practice somewhat. These repressive measures were practiced for a very long time, at least until the autumn of 1934.⁷⁶ They peaked between November–December 1932 and January–March 1933, that is, during the period marked by the maximum level of starvation of the population and the height of the Holodomor, and were one of its major weapons.

The blacklist system is proof of the types of repressions that were instituted against collectives and population groups (the Bolshevik concept of collective responsibility and collective punishment). But that was not all: the collective punishment of residents of a given village, village council, or collective farm did not exclude individual punishments meted out in the course of persecution by the organs of repression and punishment (GPU, NKVD, prosecutorial offices, courts), such as extrajudicial deportation, confiscation of property, levying of individual fines, and so on.

⁷³ See Postanova Odes'koho oblyvkonkomu vid 05.02.1933, held at DAOO, f. P-11, op. 1, spr. 141, ark. 45.

⁷⁴ Rishennia biuro Dnipropetrovs'koho obkomu KP(b)U vid 05.02.1933, held at DADO, f. R-1520, op. 3, spr. 9, ark. 172–77.

⁷⁵ See O. Veselova, V. Marochko, and O. Movchan, *Holodomory v Ukraïni: 1921–1923, 1932–1933, 1946–1947: Zlochyny proty narodu*, 2d exp. ed. (Kyiv and New York, 2000), 116.

⁷⁶ Postanova Chernihivs'koho obkomu KP(b)U vid 28.01.1934 shchodo zanesennia na “chervonu” ta “chornu” doshky riadu MTS, held at DAChO, f. P-470, op. 1, spr. 133, ark. 58; information on the “Rakovytsky” collective farm in Radomyshl raion, Kyiv province, was published in the newspaper *Borot'ba za sotsializm* (Radomyshl), 14 April 1934; information about four collective farms in the village of Kalynivka, Zinoviiv raion, Odesa province, appeared in the newspaper *Udarnyk laniv*, 1 September 1934; information on the collective farms “3-i vyrishal'nyi” and “Chervonyi khliborob” in the village of Berezhyna, Zinoviiv raion, was published in the newspaper *Udarnyk laniv*, 1 October 1934, and others.

Blacklisting could be applied to an entire county; certain county institutions; and, within the county, village councils, villages, several villages (*kushchi*), collective farms, inter-collective-farm centers, cooperatives, communes, independent farmers or collective-farm members living in a certain village/village soviet; and, in the final stage (the latter half of 1933–early 1934), even state farms and MTSs. Independent farmers (the independent farming sector) were also subject to blacklisting in a given village/village soviet and the members of a collective farm in a village/village council. Moreover, the blacklisting of collective-farm members was not equivalent to the blacklisting of an entire collective farm: at issue here were arrears and the sluggish pace of food procurement from the private homesteads of collective-farm members. Thus, members of collective farms were subject to punishment as independent farmers (on whom taxes and other obligations were levied).

The nominal features of acts on the blacklisting of an entity (a resolution, decision, or point listed in minutes of proceedings) indicate the level of legitimacy of a given decision and the degree of the individual/collective nature of its adoption, that is, the degree of responsibility on the part of the officials of party and state organs involved. It has been established that decisions were adopted by very small circles, sometimes in a formal, collegial manner (by means of a poll), which, according to party practice, meant the familiarization of members of the collegial body with decisions already adopted by the leadership so that they would express their assent.

Translated from the Ukrainian by Marta D. Olynyk